The Situation Room: The Inside Story of Presidents in Crisis by George Stephanopoulos
We arrive, fellow citizens, at the fleeting moments of a presidential campaign. Soon (hopefully) we’ll know whether it’s Kamala Harris or Donald Trump who will become the next commander in chief of the U.S. armed forces. Of all the enumerated powers under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, “commander in chief” is probably the weightiest. It’s definitely a 24/7 gig. To assist with decision-making, a vast array of national security information is available to each president. And most of it emanates from one centralized location: the White House’s Situation Room.
In The Situation Room: The Inside Story of Presidents in Crisis by George Stephanopoulos, we learn not only of the Situation Room’s inception (there is actually more than one room) but also of how its use is a commentary on a president’s management style. Stephanopoulos notes that the Situation Room (or Sit Room) has been called “the best filter in the world” and the “most important crisis management center in the entire world.” He does capital work introducing the apolitical Sit Room duty officers who staff and diligently serve each president, regardless of political party affiliation. But what makes this book really pop are the high-level interviews and stories from the archives. Even if you have a broad understanding of the events presented in this book, I posit you will still find many details in those events just flat-out wild and alarming.
The Bay of Pigs debacle was the impetus to create the Situation Room. President Kennedy wanted a centralized location in the West Wing that would hasten direct access to sensitive information. The actual physical space was utilitarian, having “all the charm of a cardboard box.” When Stephanopoulos arrived as a White House staffer in the Clinton administration, conditions apparently had not improved much. When he first saw the Sit Room, his first thought was “underwhelming.” It didn’t resemble the sleek movie depictions that go all the way back to the war room in Dr. Strangelove. (Stephanopoulos does take us through the more recent modernizations.)
President Johnson, bedeviled with the conflict in Vietnam, was a constant visitor to the Sit Room. Ever the micromanager, he would constantly call down to the duty officers. It was not uncommon for Johnson to ring the Sit Room in the middle of the night to inquire if there were any new developments coming out of Vietnam. He desperately wanted some piece of information that might take the U.S. out of what he privately remarked was a hopeless endeavor.
Full of self-pity and feeling persecuted from the Watergate scandal, President Nixon had all but retired to the White House residence where he would start drinking early in the day. As a result, Nixon was often too drunk to make immediate decisions. This created a power vacuum that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was more than happy to fill. Famously known as a realpolitik operator, Kissinger was quick to argue the value of the world viewing the United States as a “trigger-happy” military power. Other national security staff often pushed back, arguing that such force was not always a net positive. And—half a world away—it turns out that Nixon’s counterpart, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev, was also often too drunk to make decisions.
We read how President Carter used a psychic to try and locate the U.S. hostages being held in Iran. When Carter gives the order for a military rescue of the hostages (which failed miserably), Stephanopoulos is excellent in its retelling. The same is true when detailing President Obama’s order to send a Navy SEAL team into Pakistan for Osama bin Laden. Stephanopoulos places the reader right in the Sit Room, and it’s riveting.
In 1981, President Reagan was shot and rushed to a hospital. Thanks to National Security Advisor Richard Allen placing a tape recorder on the Sit Room conference table, we know how various aides and cabinet officials decided to handle the dilemma. And it’s rather shocking. During these tense moments, Vice President Bush was en route to Washington D.C. from Texas. There was a communication problem on his plane, rendering him unreachable. The transcript of the tape recording reads almost like a tragicomedy. Constitutionally, none of the men in that room were in control of the executive branch. But that didn’t stop Secretary of State Al Haig from going to the press and declaring, “As of now, I’m in control here.” Later, Allen would reply that it was an “imminently stupid” thing for Haig to say.
President George H.W. Bush appears both knowledgeable and unfailingly polite. He often invited Sit Room staff to watch movies in the White House’s theater room. A former Sit Room secretary recounts how on one Saturday morning she picked up the phone to hear President Bush actually asking for permission to enter the Sit Room. “This is the president. May I come in?”
He was also shrewd in dealing with military generals who often had their own agendas. This power play with military brass was something Secretary of State Madeleine Albright experienced in the Clinton administration. And the fact that she was the first woman to hold her position meant that it was decidedly a new experience for the generals as well.
Throughout the book, history is threaded together by those who served under multiple presidents. For instance, John Bolton assumed “high-level positions under presidents Reagan, Bush 41, Bush 43 and Trump.” Regarding Bush 43, Bolton notes that the president knew he had much to learn, so “he learned it.” Bolton doesn’t have the same take on President Trump: “He had no idea what the issues were. He never learned anything.” This observance is underscored by Trump asking if Puerto Rico—where the inhabitants are U.S. citizens—could be traded for Greenland.
Ultimately, this book is a homage to the resolute Sit Room duty officers. Career government employees are often much maligned. However, as Stephanopoulos describes, these are the people who stayed at their White House posts during the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. They ignored evacuation orders so that they could do their work. They are the ones who must decide when to move information up the chain of command, knowing that a misstep could cost lives. They also understand that for a democracy to endure there must be a continuity of government among presidents. They serve in the same spirit as President Kennedy’s call to service, a “commitment to others” that rises above one’s own self-interest.
Review by Jason Sullivan
